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WHAT IS LOST WHEN PHILANTHROPY AVOIDS 
PHILANTHROPY LAW? 
Benjamin M. Leff* 
Professor Dana Brakman Reiser has once again produced work that 
invites us all to look at philanthropy and philanthropy law in a fresh way. 
In Disruptive Philanthropy: Chan-Zuckerberg, the Limited Liability 
Company, and the Millionaire Next Door,1 Professor Reiser provides 
what she calls, “the definitive explanation” for a trend in philanthropy: 
the “seemingly bizarre choice” by some charitable donors to do 
philanthropy using a for-profit vehicle, like a limited liability company, 
rather than a traditional non-profit charitable entity, like a private 
foundation.2 Professor Reiser uses as her case-study the Chan-
Zuckerberg Initiative (CZI), which was created when the founder of 
Facebook and his wife publicly committed 99% of their net worth to 
social causes, but notably did not contribute any of it to a private 
foundation.3 Professor Reiser explains that Chan and Zuckerberg, and 
other philanthropists who have chosen to forego tax-exempt status, have 
done so both because they found certain restrictions on tax-exempt 
organizations too constraining and because they found the benefits 
(especially tax benefits) of contributing to a traditional tax-exempt 
organization insufficiently beneficial.4 She argues that this trend is likely 
to grow, and increasingly more charitable donors are likely to make use 
of the “philanthropy LLC,” thus avoiding any regulatory function that the 
current legal regime provides.5  
But the key to understanding the philanthropy LLC—at least as 
exemplified by CZI—is that it is not so much used as a substitute for 
traditional charitable contributions as a delay in making them. While 
Professor Reiser does describe some activities of CZI that will never 
involve a traditional charity,6 most of what CZI does is choose charitable 
recipients and then make contributions to them. In that way, Chan and 
Zuckerberg do take advantage of the charitable tax deduction. The 
deduction is especially valuable for philanthropists like them because 
their wealth consists almost entirely of extremely highly appreciated 
stock (in their case, stock in Facebook, the company Zuckerberg 
founded). When a donor makes a charitable contribution of appreciated 
property, they get a double tax benefit—they avoid paying capital gains 
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.
1. Dana Brakman Reiser, Disruptive Philanthropy: Chan-Zuckerberg, the Limited
Liability Company, and the Millionaire Next Door, 70 FLA. L. REV. 921 (2018). 
2. Id. at 921.
3. Id. at 922.
4. Id. at 943, 945
5. Id. at 956–57.
6. Id. at 940–42.
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tax on the appreciation in the stock and they get to deduct the full 
appreciated value of the stock.7 This double benefit is one of those tax 
perks in the charitable sector that seem almost too good to be true. It 
certainly is good enough that Chan and Zuckerberg are making full use 
of it. But they are making full use of it over time, rather than all at once. 
As Professor Reiser points out, using a philanthropy LLC (rather than 
making one’s contributions to a traditional charitable entity all at once) 
gives donors “the ability to stage donations to take maximum advantage 
of deductibility.”8 In this way, philanthropy LLC is more like a method 
for making a charitable pledge (a promise to make contributions in the 
future) than it is like a substitute for a traditional charity, but it is even 
less binding than a pledge. So long as Chan or Zuckerberg is alive and 
want to control their own philanthropy (and manage their own tax 
liability), they need not be in any hurry to make irrevocable contributions 
to a charity. They can set aside the assets they intend to use for charity at 
some point and use them when they choose. 
Professor Reiser compares the philanthropy LLC to a traditional 
charitable entity that is also used to hold wealth until such time as it will 
be deployed in active operating charities—the private foundation.9 In 
1969, Congress amended the tax code to provide special treatment for 
such entities, concerned that they were being used by philanthropists to 
get the benefit of charitable contributions while delaying deploying 
wealth actively for charitable purposes.10 Private foundations permit 
philanthropists to get the benefit, including the tax benefit, of charitable 
contributions before such contributions are deployed for charitable 
purposes.11 If philanthropists wanted to wait to get the tax benefit of their 
contributions, then they could always wait to create a private foundation, 
keeping complete control of their assets until they chose to donate them. 
Many major philanthropists in the last century waited until they were 
older to create their private foundations, maintaining the flexibility to use 
their assets as they saw fit while they were alive and relatively young, 
and only committed major portions of their wealth to private foundations 
as they thought about transitioning their wealth to the next generation. 
When viewed that way, the use of the philanthropy LLC to avoid the 
restrictions placed on private foundations seems less stark.  
7. Briefing Book: What is the Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions?, TAX POL’Y 
CTR. (2016) [hereinafter Briefing Book], https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-
tax-treatment-charitable-contributions [https://perma.cc/4FHD-J4GD].  
8. Reiser, supra note 1, at 951.
9. See id. at 931–32.
10. See, e.g., S. COMM. ON FIN., 89TH CONG., TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT ON PRIVATE 
FOUNDATIONS 23 (Comm. Print 1965). 
11. See I.R.C. § 170 (2018) (outlining the tax benefits awarded to those who give to prviate
foundations); see also Reiser, supra note 1, at 932 (noting how private foundations use their gifs 
to enable the efforts of other charitable organizations) 
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As Professor Reiser points out, though, the ability to “stage” the tax 
benefits of charitable contributions does not last forever.12 When people 
as wealthy as Chan and Zuckerberg die, their estates are subject to a 
substantial federal estate tax.13 Under current law (2019), a tax of up to 
40% is imposed on the value of an estate that exceeds 11.4 million dollars 
(22.8 million for a married couple).14 Because the exemption amount is 
so high, less than one in a thousand estates will pay federal estate tax,15 
but for truly large estates the estate tax can be a significant cost. Assets 
contributed to charity avoid the estate tax, even if they are contributed to 
a charity under the control of the decedent’s heirs.16 As Professor Reiser 
points out: 
A private foundation can hold a family's assets through 
generations without any application of the estate tax. A 
philanthropy LLC cannot function as such a perpetual tax-
free vehicle . . . . To avoid the estate tax, those with assets 
over the credit amounts will need to transfer their LLC stakes 
to exempt entities on death, or pay Uncle Sam his share.17 
Therefore, so long as there is an estate tax, philanthropists like Chan 
and Zuckerberg have a very strong tax incentive not to continue to hold 
assets they plan to use for charity outside of traditional charitable entities 
once they both die.  
That means that the benefits of the philanthropy LLC will likely last 
only a single generation. There is nothing about the philanthropy LLC 
that permits Chan and Zuckerberg to avoid the estate tax. So, as long as 
the estate tax is not repealed before they die, and as long as their estate is 
still substantial when they die, they will have to choose whether to pay 
the estate tax or pour their LLC into a private foundation then. In fact, 
they almost certainly have already made this decision (at least 
preliminarily) in their wills. Life is long and Chan and Zuckerberg are 
young; but it’s not that long, and they’re not that young. At the end of 
one generation, the difference between a private foundation and a 
philanthropy LLC is likely to evaporate for CZI. That means that the most 
important question about the philanthropy LLC is whether it creates 
12. Reiser, supra note 1, at 955.
13. See I.R.C. § 2001(a) (2018) ("A tax is hereby imposed on the transfer of the taxable
estate of every decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States."). 
14. See What’s New – Estate and Gift Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (June 13, 2019),
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/whats-new-estate-and-gift-tax 
[https://perma.cc/F2PJ-8GDX]. 
15. See Briefing Book, supra note 7.
16. See Frequently Asked Questions on Estate Taxes, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.  (July 3,
2019), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/frequently-asked-
questions-on-estate-taxes [https://perma.cc/U9MR-WV8C]. 
17. Reiser, supra note 1, at 955.
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social costs because it facilitates delay of creation of a private foundation 
for one generation—not because it facilitates the avoidance of a private 
foundation entirely, at least for estates big enough to be subject to the 
estate tax, and at least so long as the estate tax is not repealed. 
Professor Reiser provides a very balanced presentation of social 
benefits and costs of philanthropy LLC. She argues that the rise of 
philanthropy LLCs will be beneficial if it increases the amount of money 
going to charity, but as compared to private foundations, it might do so 
in a way that magnifies certain costs to the general public.18 But thinking 
of a philanthropy LLC as only a single-generation strategy casts some of 
her analysis in a different light. For example, she argues that the 
philanthropy LLC structure magnifies donor control and might insulate 
founders from outside influence.19 She contrasts philanthropy LLCs to 
large private foundations, which have made major contributions to the 
social good in the 20th Century.20 She cites some examples, including the 
Ford Foundation’s support for the civil rights movement.21 But the 
significant accomplishments she cites have been made by 
professionalized private foundations largely in the years after the death 
of their founders. As discussed above, the philanthropy LLC structure is 
probably most often a single-generation structure, and so should not be 
compared to mature, professional, multi-generational private 
foundations, like the Ford Foundation. It might be more illuminating to 
compare CZI to a private foundation whose founders are still very much 
alive, like the Gates Foundation. Do the private foundation rules 
effectively limit founder control? Do they effectively prevent founders 
from being insulated from outside influence? 
More importantly, Professor Reiser points out that the choice of a 
philanthropy LLC over a private foundation permits a philanthropist to 
avoid an “army of restrictions” on philanthropic activities.22 Again, to the 
degree to which this avoidance only lasts a single generation, the choice 
might be less socially costly than it might initially appear. To take just 
one example, private foundations are subject to the so-called “excess 
business holdings” rules, which generally prevent a private foundation 
from owning a controlling share in a for-profit company.23 If Chan-
Zuckerberg had contributed Facebook stock (which constitutes the vast 
majority of their wealth) to a private foundation, the foundation would 
have to divest itself of the vast majority of the stock. The rules operate to 
prevent a major shareholder of a company from using a private 
18. Id. at 969.
19. Id. at 966.
20. Id. at 936–37.
21. Id. at 962 n.213.
22. Id. at 932.
23. See id. at 933.
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foundation under their control to maintain control over the company. If 
they want to maintain control over the company, they must use the stock 
they own directly to do that, and the foundation under their control must 
divest itself of its stock in the company. In fact, there is a compelling 
argument that the concerns that led to the creation of the federal private 
foundation restrictions in 1969—exactly those laws that Chan and 
Zuckerberg are avoiding with their philanthropy LLC—came almost 
entirely out of concerns with dynastic control of philanthropic assets, and 
the avoidance of the estate tax that comes from such intergenerational, 
dynastic, control.24 I don’t think anyone seriously thinks that founders 
should be forced to give up control of the companies they found while 
they are alive. The purpose of the excess business holdings rule is 
primarily to prevent them from avoiding estate tax and simultaneously 
maintaining control for their heirs. There is nothing wrong with 
Zuckerberg and Chan choosing not to divest themselves of control of 
Facebook while they are both living. 
Professor Reiser also points out that the private foundation rules 
would restrict the ability of CZI to take a controlling equity interest in 
social enterprises they wish to invest in, potentially complicate 
investment in social enterprises, complicate (and possibly restrict) 
compensation for employees of the organization, and prevent the use of 
the organization’s assets for political activities.25 Again, if CZI permits 
them to use their own money to do things that they are permitted to do 
with their own money, it is not clear why that’s a problem.  
Even accepting that CZI is likely to live only until Chan and 
Zuckerberg are dead, there may be some very real costs associated with 
the use of a philanthropy LLC instead of a private foundation if the form 
is widely adopted. First, and most importantly, the single-generational 
limit on the philanthropy LLC is dependent on the taxation of 
intergenerational transfers. Under current law, some quite large estates 
can escape estate taxes, and for those estates a philanthropy LLC might 
be a viable philanthropic vehicle for generations. If the philanthropy LLC 
is adopted by the “millionaire next door” as Professor Reiser predicts,26 
then the LLC may be a useful device to create intergenerational dynastic 
control over philanthropic wealth, exactly the situation the private 
foundation rules sought to control. Even more worrisome, the legislative 
trend appears to be continuing to reduce the number of estates that owe 
the estate tax, and there is still a politically powerful movement to 
eliminate the estate tax entirely.27 If that were to happen, then the 
24. See S. COMM. ON FIN., 89TH CONG., TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT ON PRIVATE 
FOUNDATIONS 34 (Comm. Print 1965). 
25. Reiser, supra note 1, at 938, 940.
26. Id. at 957.
27. See, e.g., Jeff Stein, Top GOP Senators Propose Repealing Estate Tax, Which is
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philanthropy LLC would cease being a single-generation delay in making 
charitable contributions even for estates as large as Chan’s and 
Zuckerberg’s, and would become a potentially eternal one, with all of the 
social costs that Professor Reiser identifies. 
But even when the benefits of a philanthropy LLC are limited to single 
generation, there are potential social harms associated with it. In some 
ways, it might even be worse than philanthropists simply holding onto 
their money until they are ready to make contributions to active charities. 
These harms potentially arise because a philanthropy LLC permits 
philanthropists to make a claim about their wealth that is different from 
simply holding onto it: They are claiming they are doing philanthropy, 
even as they maintain complete control over their property. Not only that, 
they are creating an entity that holds the “allocated” wealth, appearing as 
if they have committed their wealth to charitable purposes without 
binding themselves to do so. That raises the question: Is there anything 
wrong with that? I think the answer to that is a resounding “maybe.”  
The dominant economic theory of nonprofits suggests that thinking 
about agency costs will help us evaluate the circumstances in which 
avoiding the regulation of charities is likely to be harmful.28 Nonprofit 
organizations rely on their structure (and the regulations that enforce it) 
to communicate their trustworthiness to various stakeholders. Take as an 
illustrative example the most basic difference between a private 
foundation and a philanthropic LLC: The foundation has irrevocably 
committed its assets to charitable purposes, while the members of an LLC 
can change their minds at any time.29 So, in order to understand if it 
matters that Chan and Zuckerberg have chosen to make a claim about 
their charitable intent without binding themselves to it with the tools 
provided in charity law, we need to understand what they are 
communicating when they created their philanthropy LLC. Is anyone 
relying on that symbolic act in the way they would be if Chan and 
Zuckerberg had chosen to make an irrevocable decision? Does it matter 
Expected to be Paid by Fewer than 2,000 Americans a Year, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 28, 2019, 4:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2019/01/28/top-gop-
senators-propose-repealing-estate-tax-which-is-expected-be-paid-by-fewer-than-americans-year/ 
[https://perma.cc/LYQ4-4PTD] (reporting Republican legislative proposals to repeal the federal 
estate tax). 
28. See generally Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835
(1980) [hereinafter Hansmann, Enterprise] (developing a broad perspective on the economic role 
that nonprofit organizations perform); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation 
Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Reforming] (discussing the 
shortcomings of traditional nonprofit corporation law and proposing a restructure that allows 
broader use of corporate statutes); Benjamin Moses Leff, The Case Against For-Profit Charity, 
42 SET. HALL L. REV. 819 (2012) (expanding upon agency theory to explain why the government 
should provide tax benefits only to nonprofit charitable firms). 
29. See Reiser, supra note 1, at 962.
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to the owners of Facebook stock, or to employees of CZI, or to the 
charities seeking funds from CZI, or lawmakers, or the potential 
beneficiaries of CZI initiatives, or anyone else? If any of these 
stakeholders relies on CZI’s “charitable” mission, but CZI is able to 
(purposely) avoid the terms of the law that define and constrain a 
charitable mission, then those stakeholders may be harmed. More 
importantly, if the rise of philanthropy LLCs confuses societal 
stakeholders generally about the meaning of charitable entities, and what 
rules apply to them, then the whole charitable sector could be harmed by 
this confusion. Almost forty years ago, Henry Hansmann posited that the 
charitable sector depends for its very existence on the ability of charities 
to make credible commitments to stakeholders (like donors) about what 
it will and will not do with their charitable assets.30 When stakeholders 
are confused about which organizations are charities and which are not, 
the ability of the entire charitable sector to make these credible 
commitments is diminished, and that in itself could be a harm caused by 
philanthropy LLCs. 
On the other hand, Professor Reiser does an excellent job of pointing 
out that there are numerous benefits as well, and I am as optimistic as she 
is about getting wealthy entrepreneurs involved in philanthropy. But it is 
important that all stakeholders understand that a philanthropy LLC is not 
a charity, while a private foundation (for all its many flaws) is. Luckily, 
Professor Reiser is around to explain that important fact so clearly. 
30. Hansmann, Enterprise, supra note 28, at 844.
